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Abstract--Two measures of multivariate risk aversion, closely related to certain eigenvalue 
problems are proposed here. These measures are shown to be related to multivariate 
distance concepts in statistics and its applications include risk analysis in portfolio theory, 
vector efficiency and comparison of minimax strategies in applied modelling. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk aversion has played a fundamental part in applied decision models under uncertainty. 
The measure which has found wide applications i the Arrow-Pratt (rA) measure of absolute 
risk aversion [I, 10]: 
r A = - O :u (z )/Ou (z ) (1) 
defined on the space of real-valued utility functions u(z). Here z may be a scalar, i.e., wealth 
or income, or it may be a vector of goods over which the scalar utility function is defined. 
If z = z(?, x) represents the consequences of a lottery generated by the random variables ?
with a probability distribution F(~I0) indexed by its parameters 0 (e.g., mean, variance), then 
the decision-maker (DM) has a problem of optimal decision-making under the uncertain 
environment. Two types of uses are then usually made. One is the notion of certainty 
equivalence of a lottery which has random outcomes denoted by Z. For all monotonic utility 
functions u(Z) defined on the space of ~, a DM is said to be risk averse, if he prefers u(E(~)) 
over E(u(~)), where E is the expectation operator over the nondegenerate distribution of the 
random variable £ or, o f?  given 0. If these expectations are finite, then the certainty equivalent 
(CE) of the lottery is defined by an amount :? such that 
u(e) = E[u(e)], 
i.e., the DM is indifferent between the lottery and the amount ~? for certain. If the scalar utility 
function is monotonic increasing, it follows that 
u[E(Z) - rr] = E(u(Z)), (2) 
where rr is a positive risk premium n = EZ - 2?, which is unique. It follows that if the scalar 
utility function is concave (quasiconcave), it implies risk aversion with a positive (non- 
negative) risk premium. 
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A second type of use of the risk aversion concept is in characterizing an efficient vector 
point in a stochastic system, e.g., a stochastic production process. Let x be an n-element 
output vector and X the set of all output vectors obtainable, where it is assumed that X is 
convex, closed and bounded. Then, one may define after Peleg and Yaari [1] a concept of 
efficiency that holds risk aversely. Thus, of two output vectors x, y e X, y dominates x risk 
aversely if 
piu(y,)>= ~ piu(x,) (3.1) 
i= l  i=1 
for all utility functions u(.) belonging to a set U(.) of concave and nondecreasing utility 
functions and probabilities p~ > 0, ,~p~ = 1 and furthermore, there exists an utility function 
u* e U such that 
piu*(y,) > ~, p,u*(xi) (3 .2 )  
i i 
Then, the output vector x* eX  is said to be "risk aversely efficient" (RAE), if there exists 
no other x e X that dominates x*. The importance of this result is due to its implications for 
a system of efficiency prices. Thus, they have proved that if the output vector x* e X is risk 
aversely efficient, it must have a system of price vectors n = (hi) such that 
* * implies ~ > X i >X j  
Pj Pi 
and conversely. Hence, the behavior of risk averters can be analyzed from a set of RAE vector 
points, e.g., cross-section data of risk-averse decision-makers say. 
Risk aversion measure (1) has been generalized in theory and applications [2-5] in several 
directions, e.g., (a) multivariate case when z is a vector and rA becomes a matrix [6], (b) the 
utility function u(.) is quasiconcave and specifies asymmetry, (c) the underlying probability 
distribution of £ or of ? is other than normal, i.e., it belongs to nonsymmetrical class of 
distributions, (d) the information channels (sample observations) are incomplete (not very 
large), and (e) the case where unequal risk aversions may lead to various degrees of deviation 
from the level of a Pareto-efficient solution defined in a risk-neutral world. From an applied 
viewpoint here have been other generalizations [7-9] emphasizing the statistical estimation 
of some of the parameters of the above stochastic decision problem, e.g., (f) the estimation 
of ra in a situation where it is a constant, due to maximizing expected utility Eu(z) when 
u(z) = -exp(  - ctz) and z is normally distributed with mean # and variance 0 "2, (g) estimating 
the mean and variance parameters of the distribution F(?[0), 0 = (#, 0.2) from observed ata 
on ? in portfolio models, (h) applying Bayesian methods to improve the estimates of mean 
and variance parameters from sequential observations or through ARIMA (autoregressive 
integrated moving average) procedures, and (i) building reliability measures for the linear 
constraints of a stochastic LP model. 
Two new generalizations are proposed here in the theory of multivariate risk aversion. The 
first arises when the utility function u(z) is not a scalar but a vector. This framework is 
important for example in team decision problems, when each member has an individual utility 
function, e.g., uj(z) is the utility function o f j th  member and U = (uj(z)) is a vector of utility 
functions for the team, where z denotes the random outcome or payoff or the team. Other 
areas of application of this framework include multicriteria objective functions for a decision 
problem, stochastic optimization models where there is no knowledge or information about 
the probability distributions F(?[0) and situations involving noncooperative games with 
different payoff functions for different players. 
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A second approach to multivariate risk aversion considers the situation where the 
stochastic outcomes z belongs to several populations rather than one. Thus, if there are K 
populations indexed by Fk(([0), we have K expected utilities which may contain for example 
K means and variances (#k, ak2), k = l, 2 . . .  K. This framework is useful in selecting the best 
population prior to applying the criterion of maximizing expected utility. Other areas of 
application include stochastic dominance of one distribution over another [10], optimal 
statistical design theory [11], LP problems with stochastic objective functions having facets 
subject o a mixture of K population distributions [12], and problems of optimal search and 
detection, where in the first stage we have to search for the best of the K populations and 
in the second choose the decision vector which is optimum in some sense. 
The framework of our presentation is as follows. Section 2 presents the two approaches 
through some operational examples. This is followed by some theoretical results in Sec. 3. 
A few lines of possible applications in applied decision models are indicated in the concluding 
section. 
2. APPROACHES TO MULTIVARIATE RISK AVERSION 
As a characterization of multivariate risk aversion (MRA) we propose the method of 
variance information manifold, following the approach of James [5] in multivariate statistics. 
Let z' = (zl, z2. •. z~) be a row vector with N elements, so that £i = z~(O) denotes the payoff 
for member i = 1, 2 . . .  N which is assumed to depend on a set of parameters 0 through the 
distribution function F(~.[O). The N-dimensional vector z has mean /z and 
variance-covariance matrix V, where V forms a convex cone in ~)N(N + 1) dimensional 
Euclidean space. Each nonsingular variance-covariance matrix V is associated with an 
information matrix J = V -I. The variance information manifold is then characterized by the 
space in which each interior point has alternative coordinate matrices V or j - l .  The set of 
singular positive semidefinite matrices when V is singular constitutes part of the boundary 
of this manifold. A concept of geodesic distance is introduced in this manifold by 
2"]1/2 
(4.1) 
where 2i are the N eigenvalues of the characteristic equation: 
[V2- AV~I =0, (4.2) 
where V~, V2 are any two positive definite symmetric matrices, representing, for example, two 
information structures, available to the team. Note that the vector 2 '= (21, 22... AM) of 
eigenvalues of the scalar distance function D = D(2) in (4.1) can be used as a measure of 
MRA. Thus, if VI represents complete information structure (or, complete certainty), whereas 
V2 denotes a variance measure of outcomes for incomplete information (or, uncertainty), the 
above distance measure D(2) or the vector 2' may be used to specify the value of obtaining 
complete information relative to the no information or less information case. Some other uses 
of the above concept include the following: 
(i) If the column vector z is normally distributed N(/~, V) where V = V~ in terms of (4.2) and 
V2 is the sample estimate obtained by maximum likelihood estimation, then the statistic 
S N 
d 2 = -~ )'~j (log 2,) 2 
is asymptotically distributed like a chi-square variate with ½N(N + 1) degrees of freedom. 
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Using this statistic, one could test'the distance of estimates like V2 from their populations. 
(ii) In many agricultural applications, the output vector x '  = (x(1), x (2 ) . . ,  x(N))  of dimen- 
sion k say may change due to price support or other stabilization programs which reduce 
overall risks of price fluctuations; one may then compare through the geodesic distance (4.1) 
the difference between the two variance--covariance matrices V~(x) and V2(x) one before and 
the other after the price stabilization program. 
(iii) If U is the utility vector for an N-member team each with a control vector x(/'), 
j = 1, 2 . . .  N, such that its expected value is concave and differentiable with strict concavity 
for at least one member j, then the MRA matrix defined by 
R = O2Euj(x) (5) 
Ox(j)OxU)' 
must be positive semidefinite. If the expected utility vector is separable in x( j) ,  then one could 
write up to a second-order approximation 
Euj =/~j(x(j)) - -~ a/(x (j)); ~j > O, (6) 
where #j and 0"j 2 a re  the means and variances of ;~ = z(x( j ) )  which depend on the control 
vector x( j )  chosen by member j of the team. The optimal decision then is given by x*(j),  
if it maximizes Euj. Denote the mean vector and variance--covariance matrix of x*( j )  by 
N 
2 = N- '  ~ x*( j) ,  /Ix = E[(x*(j)  -- .~)(x*(j) - .~)'] 
j= l  J 
Vj = E[(x*(j)  - g)(x*( j )  - Y)' IJ fixed]. 
x 
If the vector 7' = (0{1, ~2.  • • aN)  of nonnegative risk aversion increases, what happens to the 
variance-covariance matrices Vx, Vj which broadly represent dissimilarity from the mean 
solution 5? How would one measure dissimilarity if the means are equal, i.e., gj = ~,  all j 
but variances (aj) or, risk aversion parameters (~9) differ across the team? Partial answers to 
these questions are possible in terms of the geodesic distance D defined in (4.1). 
Note, however, that the distance measure D in (4.1) is defined in terms of 
variance-covariance matrices. This is necessary when D is viewed as a statistic for testing 
some empirical hypothesis. In other cases, we may not have variance--covariance matrices, 
but still the distance measure may be defined. Hence, we would need to generalize the above 
concept. To illustrate our generalization we consider the following LP problem: 
maxz =c'x ;  X = {xlx >O, Ax <b},  
xEX 
where it is assumed that the elements cj, a 0, bi in (c, A, b) are strictly positive. This structure 
is present in most economic applications where x contains outputs and b denotes available 
inputs. Denote the set of feasible bases and nonbases by (B k, N k,k = 1, 2 . . .  K) and 
corresponding outputs by x k, x k, respectively. Then we set up the following modified LP 
model: 
c ~xs  + C~kXN + )~k max fk = ' k , k 
l~k<K 
s.t. Bkxkn+ Nkx k = b (7.1) 
2kb =xks; (k = 1 ,2 . . .K ) ,  
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where the last constraint has been added to the original LP to stipulate that outputs hould 
be proportional to inputs. If the LP model (7. l) has a solution for each k fixed, then we have 
an eigenvalue problem 
(B* - O, l )x~ = O, k = 1, 2 . . .  K and 0, = ).,-l. 
Since B* is a nonnegative matrix, there exists by Frobenius theorem [13], a real eigenvalue 
0~ say and its associated eigenvector x~, such that they are nonnegative and satisfy the 
determinantal equations: 
IB* - 0~I[  = 0, (7.2) 
where 0* is maximal in the sense that it is equal to or greater than the absolute value of any 
other eigenvalue. Furthermore, if each B k is indecomposable in the sense that there does not 
exist any permutation matrix P such that 
P - 'B*P = B22J 
where Bn, B22 are square submatrices, then the maximal eigenvalue 0* and its eigenvector 
x k, is strictly positive. This maximal eigenvalue 0" is unique up to a positive scalar multiple. 
Denote by 0" the maximum of the Frobenius eigenvalues, i.e., 
0"= max O* 
I<k~K 
and by x* the associated eigenvector. The distance of 0* from 0* from 0 ~ for k # 0 or, of 
xk, from x* may then indicate the extent of departure from the optimal solution. A numerical 
example would be helpful. Assume the following: 
c '=( I ,  l), 
where B' is the initial basis with all slack variable in the basis and B ° is the optimal basis. 
For the initial basis solution the Frobenius eigenvalue is 0* = 1.0 with the eigenvector 
(xt.) ' = (I, !) and optimal profit is zero. But for the optimal basis B °, 0* = 4, (x*)' = (4!, 4 !) and 
the optimal profit is 0.50. The squared Euchdean distance between points (x J.) and (x~) is 
2.125. 
Now consider a weighted combination of the two facets of the objective function of (7.1), 
i.e., J~ replacing fk as follows: 
max ~ = w(c '~x~ + c '~x~)  + (1 - W)Rk, 
I <k~K 
(7.3) 
where 0 <: w ~ 1. If w is set equal to zero, then the prices c' = (c~, c~) have no role in 
determining an optimal output vector. This is exactly the case for many public sector decision 
making units (DMU), where explicit market prices for its outputs do not exist. However, in 
such cases the Frobenius eigenvalues would exist and the criterion of maximum positive 
eigenvalue would determine an optimal solution. 
In this framework MRA can be introduced if the elements contained in (c, ,4, b) are partly 
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stochastic. For instance, consider the LP model for the decision variables, x and 2: 
maxf  = (c! 0)'x + 2 
X, .;, 
s.t. (A i I,,,)x = b 
,~(g)=x 
x>0,  b >0,  
(8.1) 
wh~re x includes the vector of slack variables and lm is the identity matrix of order m. Let 
c be stochastic in the nonnegative domain with c~-, c~ ÷ denoting lower and upper 5% value 
when ~ = 0.05. Replacing c in (8.1) by cff.05 we solve the LP model (8.1) to obtain a risk averse 
solution and its Frobenius eigenvalues. Likewise, we solve for c = cJ-.05. The difference of the 
two solutions, one more risk averse than the other may then be measured in terms of the 
distance of the two Frobenius eigenvalues. If the statistical distribution of the Frobenius 
eigenvalues and their difference can be derived, one could set up a test statistic to test the 
difference in impact of increased risk aversion. 
When the price vector c is not available, as in the case of public sector DMU's, we adopt 
a different approach for characterizing efficiency in a risk averse environment. Assume that 
we have observations on the input and output vectors yj, x~ for j th  DMU, having n and rn 
elements, respectively. Assume that xj is normally distributed with a positive mean vector mj 
and variance--covariance matrix Sj, while the input vector yj is nonrandom. Denote by. the 
scalar quantity #j the risk averse level of output value 
#j=v'mj-°~w'Sjw;- v > O, w >_ O,~ > O, 
Z 
for j th  DMU, j  = 1, 2 . . .  N, where it is assumed that the risk aversion parameter ~ is identical 
for allj. Here the vectors v, w are unknown prices to be determined. Define a ratio of weighted 
outputs to weighted inputs for each j as 
hi= ltj "=1,2 .  N, p'yj' J .. 
where p is a vector of nonnegative prices of inputs. Given the cluster of N DMU's, we want 
to test if a particular DMU is risk aversely efficient or not. Denote the DMU under reference 
by subscript zero and set up the following nonlinear functional fractional program: 
maxho s.t. 0<h j_<l ,  j= I ,2 . . .N  (9.1) 
V, w, p 
w,v ,p>O.  
If there exists an optimal set w*, v*, p* of nonnegative prices at which h ~ < 1, then the DMU 
under reference is not risk aversely efficient relative to he cluster. For the cluster to be RAE 
at the rate of risk aversion ~, it must contain only those DMU for which h~ - 1.00. Note 
that under these observations (mj, Sj, yj) and constraints of (9.1) no other set of common 
weights other than those (w*, v*,p*) will give a more favorable rating to the DMU under 
reference (i.e., j = 0) relative to the comparison set of N units. Hence, if the maximal value 
of h 0* is not equal to 1.0 under the optimal set (w*, v*, p*) of nonnegative weights it will not 
be attained from any other set. 
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Several specifications of the nonlinear functional fractional program (9.1) may be useful 
in applied decision situations. First, if there were no risk aversion in the sense that a is zero, 
we would obtain an LP model from (9.1), provided the price weights for inputs are so 
normalized that 
p'yj = 1 for all j = 1, 2 . . .  N. (9.2) 
Also, if there is risk aversion on the input side and we replace the term for weighted inputs 
by the scalar quantity 
~ r S jr; qj = p'fij -- , ~ p,r, fl > O 
yj ~ NC j, 4)  
we obtain hj as 
hj = hi(a, fl) = laj/qj. 
Then we set up the nonlinear fractional program (9.1) for determining an optimal set 
(v, w, p, r) of weights or prices for measuring efficiency under risk aversion. This approach 
of measuring efficiency provides a generalization of the efficiency concept developed by 
Farrell, Charnes and Cooper and others [14-17]. Second, the impact of risk aversion in the 
sense of = increasing (or decreasing) from the level a =/3 > 0 can be analyzed. Thus if an 
increase of ~ from the level fl = 0 affects each DMU equally, then it follows that if the kth 
DMU is RAE [or risk aversely inefficient (RAI)] for a = 0 when k = 0 in (9.1), then it will 
remain so for all ~ > 0. In this case, n can serve as an overall measure of risk aversion for 
the team. Third, the nonlinear program (NLP) given by (9.1) reduces to an LP problem in 
case the variance--covariance matrices Sj, ~ are diagonal with elements a~,.j, 02,,j in the 
diagonal. Hence, a new set of nonnegative prices u for outputs and t for inputs can be 
optimally solved for by redefining hj as follows: 
h j=(v 'mJ -2u 'a j ) (p 'yy -~t 'd j ) - '  
hj>O, hj< 1, all j  = 1 ,2 . . .N  
p')~ - ~ i 'd r = 1 (normalization condition) 
aj = diag(a~j), 5j = diag(5~j). 
The formal similarity of this formulation with the modified LP problem (8.1) can be directly 
observed by introducing a scalar positive number ;t in the optimization problem associated 
with (9.3). Thus, 
max 2 s.t. O<v'mj -~u aj<2 
u,v >0,2  >0, j  = 1 ,2 . . .N  
2 < 1.0. 
(9.4) 
Following von Neumann's concept of efficiency [13, 18], we may say that the system (9.4) is 
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efficient if there exists an optimal solution of the above LP problem with v*, u*, 2" such that 
2" > 1.0. The set of nonnegative optimal prices u*, v* > 0 associated with an efficient system 
may be called efficiency prices, although these need not be unique, unless additional 
conditions are imposed on mj and aj. 
Next we consider the second type of characterization f MRA where we have one DM 
or a scalar utility function but many population distributions to which the random variable 
? in z = z(?, x) may belong. To motivate the problem, consider the optimal decision situation 
in portfolio theory [19], where there are n securities with random return ~ for security 
i = 1,2. . .  n. We minimize the total variance of return, 
s.t. 
i=1  i=1  
••  
mix  i >_ laz 
i= l  
x i> 0 
(1o.1) 
subject o the condition that the expected return be not less than the level g: stipulated by 
the DM. Thus, if ~ is distributed with mean and variance--covariance parameters m; and v~j, 
respectively, we have the quadratic program (10.1) in the decision variables x~,x~. . ,  xn. 
Define a new set of decision variables 
Yi  - -  Xi - -  X i 
* preassigned and specify, after suitable measured as deviations from the reference l vels x~ 
parameterization a d normalization, a reduced version of the portfolio problem as 
min a 2 = y" Vy 
Y 
s.t. m'y=l ;  V=(vu) 
m = (m,). 
(10.2) 
For applying this type of model we need to know the parameters m, V exactly and also the 
reference l vels or goals x*. Also, the DM may be interested in only a subset of n securities, 
say r in number < n, since the number n may be quite large. Denote by K the total number 
of selections of r items out of n, i.e., 
(:) = r!(n - r)! = K 
and let k be any such selection, for which the mean and variance-covariances are re(k),  V(k),  
respectively. On squaring the equality constraint of (10.2), we obtain the final form of the 
normalized model 
min tr 2(k ) = y (k )" V(k )y (k ) 
ytn) 
s.t. y(k ) 'M(k )y (k )= 1 (10.3) 
M(k)  = (m(k)m(k) ' ) .  
It is clear that the optimal solution y*(k )  of (10.3) would also be optimum for (10.2). Denote 
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the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint of (10.3) by ;t(k), then the stationarity 
condition implies the following eigenvalue problem: 
IV(k) - ;t(k)M(k)]y(k) = 0. (10.4) 
Since M(k), V(k) are symmetric and positive semidefinite, the eigenvalues ;t(k) are all real 
and nonnegative and can be ordered. Let ;t,(k), ;t*(k) be the lowest and the highest 
eigenvalue with associated eigenvectors y,(k), y*(k). The optimal solution of the portfolio 
problem 00.3) is then given by (;t,(k ), y ,(k ), ~,(k)), where 
Iv(k) - ;t,(k)M(k)l = 0 
However there are K selections. Hence, other policies can be defined as follows: 
2* = min max ;t(k) = min ;t*(k) (10.5) 
k 2 k 
;t ° = min min ;t(k) = min 2.(k). (10.6) 
k 2 k 
Note that 20* and the associated eigenvector y ~ denote a minimax policy, i.e., best of the 
worst, whereas 0 0 2. ,  y .  specify a most pessimistic risk averse optimum policy with two facets 
of risk aversion, one over K selections and the other over r eigenvalues. Note that the K 
selections can be interpreted as alternative allocations in the active approach of stochastic 
LP theory [16], conditional on which the expected utility function is defined, i.e., net return 
or profit Fy, under the assumption of normality and conditional on the plan y(k) chosen, 
has the conditional normal distribution with mean m '(k )y (k) and covariance y "(k ) V(k )y (k). 
Tim concept of geodesic distance introduced in (4.1) may therefore be applied for each k fixed, 
e.g., 
n~ = ~" (log 2,(k)) 2, (10.7) 
i=l  
where ;tl(k) are the r eigenvalues of the system (10.4). Since zero eigenvalues are not excluded, 
we adopt the convention log 0 = 0 in the distance concept (10.7). Denote the ordered values 
of D~ as 
0 ~ D~I ) _< D~2 ) <_''" <_ D~,) 
then, one may also characterize a risk averse optimal plan Y(k) as the one which has the 
property 
D~k)= min D(2), 
I <j<K 
i.e., it is the selection with the lowest value of D 2. Note that these distance measures are 
absolute rather than relative. Sometimes the selections may be based on the relative distances. 
For example, if the K normal populations, one for each selection are homoscedastic, .e., have 
a common variance one may define the relative distance measures t$ as 
¢~I 2 2 2 = D, )  - D( , ) ,  52 = D~2) - D~k) . .  • 5k =D(k+l )  --  D~k). 
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Thus, if t50 is the threshold value of di for separating the indifference and preference zones, 
the DM may choose the k th ordered selection Ytk), if 6k ÷ 1 > 60. These selection rules may be 
applied by the DM to statistically test the difference between any two optimal plans 
yl~l, yl~l 
when independent sample estimates rh(1), rh(2) are available under homoscedasticity. 
Other applications of the best selection problem for K multivariate normal populations 
are available in stochastic linear programming theory [11, 12, 20]. 
3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A few theoretical implications of the MRA concepts will be emphasized in this section. 
First, we consider the portfolio theory model (10.3) under two different selections K = 2 
with the modification that we replace M(k)  in the normalization condition by 
hYl(k) = rh(k)'rh(k), where rh(k) denotes a diagonal matrix with elements mi in the diagonal. 
This is done to avoid the zero eigenvalues. For each k = 1, 2 we choose the minimal 
eigenvalue 2,(k) of the problem 
[V(k) - 2(k ),f.l(k )]y(k ) = O, (11) 
which would be positive if both V(k), ~r(k) are symmetric and positive definite. The 
eigenvector associated with 2,(k) is denoted by y, (k) .  Now define a new mixed strategy 
y = wy(1) + (1 - w)y(2) --- y(w) 
V = w2V(l) + (1 - w)2V(2) = V(w) 
th = writ(1) + (I - w)6t(2) = rh(w) 
)14 = (rh'th) = ~r(w), 0 < w _< 1, 
where it is assumed for simplicity that the random returns vector ~(1), ~(2) for the two pure 
strategies are statistically independent. The eigenvalue problem associated with this mixed 
strategy solution is then 
IV(w) - ~ . (w)~(w) ]y (w)  = o O l . l )  
Definition 1. The DM is called risk averse if he prefers a mixed strategy solution over the 
pure strategies in the sense 
2,(w) _> min(2,(1), 2,(2)) 
for some w,O< w < 1 
(11.2) 
and strictly risk-averse if 
2,(w) > min(2,(l), 2,(2)), 0 < w < 1, (I 1.3) 
where we use the abbreviation 
~2,(1). if 2,(1) < ~,(2) 
min().,(1), 2,(2)) = [2,(2) otherwise. 
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Using this definition, the following results may be proved. Brief outlines of proof are given 
in Appendix. 
THEOREM 1. If the matrices V(k), h~t(k) are symmetric positive definite, then there always 
exists a risk averse solution in the sense of (1 1.2). The risk averse solution satisfies the 
generalized eigenvalue problem (11.1) for some w, 0 < w < 1. 
THEOREM 2. If there is a risk averse solution 2,(w) for some w, 0 < w < 1, then there must 
exist a lower and upper value w,,  w* of w such that 2,(w) > ;t ,(w,) and 2,(w) < 2,(w*). 
Remark 1. Note that Definition 1 of a risk averse solution is based on the presumption 
that a risk averse DM always prefers a mixing of two uncertain consequences to the worse 
of the two alternatives. 
Remark 2. If the means rh(1), rh(2) are identical for the two strategies but not the 
variances, then one may directly apply the concept of geodesic distance (4.1) defined before, 
in terms of 
l v(2)-  V(w)l = o 
 V(w>l = o 
to test the difference in distance from a given variance structure V(w). 
Definition 2. A strategy is defined to be minimax in terms of the eigenvalue problem (11) 
if there exists a positive eigenvalue 2" satisfying 
2~' = rain 2*(k) = min max 2(k) > 0. (11.4) 
k k 2 
The associated eigenvector y* is called the minimax eigenvector. 
THEOREM 3. If the matrices V(k), .~r(k) are symmetric and positive definite, then there 
always exists a minimax strategy 2~ in the sense of (11.4). Furthermore, the minimax strategy 
satisfies the inequality 
2" > 2,(w) > min(2,(1), 2,(2)), 0 < w < 1 (11.5) 
for some w, where 2,(w), 2,(1), 2,(2) are defined in (11.2). 
Remark 1. In the sense in which 2,(w) is a risk averse solution, 2" is strongly risk averse 
if it holds that ,l* > min(2,( l) ,  2,(2). 
Remark 2. If for some if, 0 < ff < 1 the inequalities (11.5) hold, then by continuity there 
must exist a local neighborhood of ff for which they will hold. This may be used to define 
local and weak case of risk aversion, to be distinguished from global risk aversion where 
(11.5) holds for all w in the domain 0 < w < 1. 
Next we consider MRA when there are N DMU's each with a common set of input (Yi) 
and output (xj) vectors fo r j  = 1, 2 . . .  N and the nonlinear program (9.1) is used to define 
risk aversely efficient or inefficient solution for a specific DMU. If the uncertainty elements 
or noise components in the input vector yj are negligible, one may reasonably impose the 
normalization condition (9.2), so that the fractional program (9.1) reduces to a nonlinear 
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program (NLP) for maximizing a quadratic oncave function subject o quadratic onstraints. 
For this type of NLP problem, one could prove the following results. 
THEOREM 4. If the k th DMU is RAE (RAI) according to NLP (9.1) with the normalization 
condition (9.2) for a specific risk level ~ > 0, then it will remain so for all other risk levels 
> u0. However, if the kth DMU is RAE (RAI) for ~ = 0, it may or may not remain so for 
any arbitrary positive levels of ~. 
Remark 1. The ranking of N DMU's according to efficiency through linear weights (i.e., 
a = 0) may not be invariant for positive levels of risk aversion. 
Remark 2. A similar result analogous to Theorem 4 could be stated in cases where there 
is risk aversion (fl) on the input side only, with normalization applied on the output side 
= o) .  
THEOREM 5. Suppose we require the nonnegative weights to be equal, v = w for the NLP 
problem (9.1) with the normalization condition (9.2). Then the NLP problem has an optimal 
solution vector v, if there exist nonnegative scalars 3j, pj, j = 1, 2 . . .  N not all zero such that 
m, + (pj -- gj)mj + a (6j - pj)S~ - St v <_ 0 
j= l  j 
1-v 'mj+-~vSy  =0,  j= I ,2 . . .N  
pj vmj - - -~v~v =0,  j= I ,2 . . .N  
and the matrix T is positive semidefinite where 
N 
T= E (pj-  j)sj + 
j= l  
Remark 1. If the nonnegative scalars pj, dij satisfy pj > 6j with at least one inequality being 
strict, then the matrix T is a nonnegative combination of N variance--covariance matrices Sj, 
each of which is positive semidefinite. 
Remark 2. If there are two DMU's (N = 2), each on the risk aversely efficiency boundary 
satisfying 
(1 + p*)m, + p'm2 = c(((1 + p*)S, + p*S2)v* 
v*>O, p2,p2 >0 
then the optimal weight vector o* has the following marginal variations: 
av*/d~ < O, ~v*/~m > O, av*/dS < O, 
where m = (1 + p*)m, + p'm2, S = (1 + p*)S~ + p'S2. Note that the optimal weights v* are 
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specific to each of N DMU's and hence are not comparable for different DMU's. However. 
it is clear from the specification of the problem that if the kth DMU is RAI under its ow~ 
set of weights, it cannot be RAE under any other set of weights. This leads to the questio~ 
if one can develop a common set of weights [17]. Although this question is not investigated 
here, we consider a specific example. Suppose ach of N DMU's has an identical mean outpul 
vectors mj = m0, al l j  but different variance--covariance matrices ~. Then each DMU is equally 
efficient at the mean but may not be equally RAE. Hence, we set up the following NLP for 
the kth DMU: 
minf (k)  = V'SkV 
v 
s.t. v'Sjv >_ l , j=  1,2 . . . k . . .N  
v_>O. 
(12) 
Then, if 1.0 denotes the fully efficient level, the kth DMU is risk aversely inefficient if at the 
optimal solution denoted by v,(k) we have f (v , (k))> 1.0. However, if we rewrite the 
constraints of (12) in the form 
N 
v "Syv = 1, v _> 0 (12) 
j= l  
and minimizef(k) defined in (12), we obtain N optimal weights v,(k), k = 1, 2 . . .  N. Of these 
weight vectors we may select as the reference set any of the following: 
(i) min f(v,(k)) =f , :  most risk averse case 
l~k<l  
(ii) max f(v*(k)) =f* :  
I<k<l  
(iii) wf, + (l -- w)f*  =f* :  
least risk averse case 
[where upper asterisk 
indicates that we are 
maximizing f (k )] 
average risk averse case, 
0<w<l ,  
where f *  denotes an average of the least and the most risk averse cases. For reasons of 
representativeness and nonparametric robustness, the average should preferably belong to the 
median class. Denote the reference set chosen by f, which must satisfy 
tT'Sjt~ = 1 = v' v. 
j= l  j I 
The distance of any other optimal solution v(k) may then be analyzed in terms of the 
eigenvalue problems 
and the concept of geodesic distance defined before in (4.1) becomes readily applicable. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Some comments on the various concepts of multivariate risk aversion analyzed before may 
be in order. First, consider the model (9.1) along with (9.2) where v = w. If v'xj is normally 
distributed wih mean v'mj and standard deviation (v'Sjv) 1/2, then there will be a certain 
probability ur>0.50 with which the random variable v'xj will exceed the level 
(v'mj - ct(v'Sjv)l/2), e.g., the ruin level of probability is uj -- 0.99. If for all j = 1, 2 . . .  N the 
probability level uj is the same, i.e., uj = u0 > 0.50, then the risk averse fficiency or inefficiency 
may be said to hold at probability u0. This provides some partial link with the concept of 
Peleg and Yaari. 
Second, the notion of a positive risk premium that can be associated with risk aversion 
in univariate case, e.g., (2) may not be uniquely definable in our multivariate cases, although 
it may be characterized in suitable cases. For instance consider the cases (10.5) and (10.6) 
where minimax and minimin strategies are defined. In a game theoretic sense of a two-person 
nonzero-sum game, it may be visualized that 2(k) for a fixed k is chosen by the second player 
and the DM is the first player choosing among K selections. If the choice of 2(k) is from 
a stochastic mechanism, we have the case of a two-person oncooperative stochastic game 
that has been analyzed elsewhere [11, 20]. In such a framework the minimax strategy (2 ~, y*) 
may be more robust or more stable than the minimin strategy 0 0 (2.,  y . ) .  The relative gain from 
stability or robustness provides a measure of risk premium. 
Third, the concept of risk aversion has several facets that require spelling out before one 
applies such a concept. Even in a univariate case, one may distinguish at least five facets as 
follows: (i) the form of the utility function u(z) defining the rate of absolute risk aversion 
in (1), its asymmetry and the scale parameters, (ii) form of the probability distribution F(?IO ) 
of ? which induces the distribution ofz  in u(z), its asymmetry and the role of higher moments 
on and beyond the second, (iii) stochastic game framework, when the selection of ? from a 
chance mechanism is made by a noncooperative player who is facing the decision maker, (iv) 
the information available to the DM is incomplete in some sense so that search efforts and 
costs may have to be incurred, and (v) robust policies in the sense of nonparametric strategies 
may be called for in an uncertain environment, where by nonparametric strategies we mean 
those actions which do not depend on specific shapes of utility functions or of probability 
distributions. 
In the multivariate case two other facets may be added, e.g., (vi) the utility function u(z) 
may be a vector as in team decision problems, with the associated game-theoretic structure 
depending on the degree of cooperation or noncooperation among team members and (v) the 
parameters may belong to more than one population or more than one information structure. 
The yon Neumann theory of expected utility maximization for uncertain outcomes utilizes 
the notions of concavity of the utility function and the existence of a meaningful maximum 
expected utility, none of which may hold under a game theoretic structure of N-person 
nonzero-sum games, e.g., concavity of the individual payoff functions is not required for a 
mixed strategy solution, expected payoff would depend on the subjective distributions of the 
players' strategies and the sequence of learning allowed for. These game theoretic aspects 
would be discussed elsewhere. 
APPENDIX 
Brief outlines of proof of Theorems 1-5 are given here. 
THEOREM 1. Since /Q(k) is symmetric and positive definite, it can be factored as 
iQ(k) = LL" where L is a lower triangular nonsingular square matrix (i.e., otherwise known 
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as Cholesky decomposition). Then the eigenvalue problem (11.0) reduces to 
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L[2(k ) I  - L -2 VL ' - ' ]q  = O, q = L 'y (k ) .  
But the matrix (L -~ VL" - i )  is symmetric and positive definite and hence the eigenvalues 2(k) 
are all real and positive and can be ordered from the lowest to the highest. Hence the existence 
of  a risk averse solution. 
THEOREM 2. Since the eigenvalues 2(w) are continuous functions of  the elements o f  V(w), 
~r(w), each of  which being continuous functions of  w, where w belongs to the compact set 
0 < w < 1 we have the existence of  w , ,  w*. The minimum eigenvalues 2 , (w , ) ,  2,(w*),  which 
must be positive are therefore defined. Hence the result. 
THEOREM 3. The existence of  minimax strategies follows from the arguments given in 
Theorem 1, since all the eigenvalues are real and positive. 
THEOREM 4. I f  the kth  unit is risk aversely efficient (inefficient), then the necessary 
conditions o f  an opt imum solution must hold at ~0. For any other level of  ~ > ~0, these 
necessary conditions remain the same. Hence risk averse efficiency (inefficiency) continue to 
hold throughout he neighborhood efined by ~ > ~0 > 0. However, the case a ~-0 differs 
from a = 0, since the former implies a nonlinear program with quadratic onstraints, whereas 
= 0 leads to a linear program. 
THEOREM 5. The NLP  problem defined by (9.1) and (9.2) involves maximization of  a 
concave quadratic function subject o a set o f  quadratic onstraints 0 < hj < 1. The constraints 
C~ = {hi > 0, v > 0} defines a convex set C, since each hj is a strictly concave function of  V. 
However, the set (?2 = {hi < 1, v > 0} need not define a convex set, since (1 - hi) is not a 
concave function of  v. However, if the matrix T defined in the theorem is positive semidefinite, 
then by the sufficiency conditions o f  the Kuhn-Tucker  theorem, the optimal solution v* 
maximizing hk(v) exists. Hence, v* must lie either in the set C~ or in the intersection of  C1 
with the boundary hi(v) = 1 of  (?2. In either case, the necessary conditions would characterize 
the optimal solution. 
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